DeadDropBox: A Time-Locked Safe for Data by Herriott, Robert et al.
Santa Clara University
Scholar Commons
Computer Engineering Senior Theses Engineering Senior Theses
6-13-2019
DeadDropBox: A Time-Locked Safe for Data
Robert Herriott
Peter Paulson
Nathaniel Kragas
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.scu.edu/cseng_senior
Part of the Computer Engineering Commons, and the Electrical and Computer Engineering
Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Engineering Senior Theses at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Computer Engineering Senior Theses by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact rscroggin@scu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Herriott, Robert; Paulson, Peter; and Kragas, Nathaniel, "DeadDropBox: A Time-Locked Safe for Data" (2019). Computer Engineering
Senior Theses. 135.
https://scholarcommons.scu.edu/cseng_senior/135
SANTA CLARA UNIVERSITY
DEPARTMENT OF ENGINEERING
Date: June 13, 2019
I HEREBY RECOMMEND THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER MY SUPERVISION BY
Robert Herriott
Peter Paulson
Nathaniel Kragas
ENTITLED
A for
BE ACCEPTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF
BACHELOR OF SCIENCE IN COMPUTER SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING
^. (^-
Thesis Advisor
p.b
Department Chair
DeadDropBox: A Time-Locked Safe for Data
by
Robert Herriott
Peter Paulson
Nathaniel Kragas
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
Bachelor of Science in Computer Science and Engineering
School of Engineering
Santa Clara University
Santa Clara, California
June 13, 2019
DeadDropBox: A Time-Locked Safe for Data
Robert Herriott
Peter Paulson
Nathaniel Kragas
Department of Computer Science and Engineering
Santa Clara University
June 13, 2019
ABSTRACT
This project is a proof-of-concept for software which would allow users to securely store sen-
sitive data in such a way that it is di cult or impossible for third parties to compromise the data,
even when the user is compelled to assist them. It will operate by storing data across multiple
devices in a unreadable form so that it is inaccessible until the data is reunified. The user may
specify the circumstances under which di↵erent pieces of the data may be accessed, so that it is
impossible to access under circumstances of duress.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Problem Statement
1.1.1 Motivation
Even over their own citizens, countries hold excessive powers to compel people to turn over their
own private information as they are crossing borders. In the United States, for example, the gov-
ernment can (and does) detain its own citizens for up to eight hours if they refuse to decrypt their
devices as they return from a trip abroad. This, relative to the extensive powers reserved by other
nations, does not seem too horrible, but it is nonetheless a legal loophole which is regularly abused
by the state in order to extract confidential information from U.S. citizens without warrant. Even
if one ignores the ethical component of these laws, one has to accept that the law is out of touch
with the technological realities of the situation: data freely flows across most national borders (and
we’re hard at work on the exceptions) every millisecond, unimpeded and securely encrypted by
those who are transmitting it. To have such an arcane regulation as to confiscate all information
which a person can access simply because it happens to be in the same place as them as they are
returning to their own country would be hilarious if it was not so irritating.
1.1.2 Solution
The solution to one legal loophole seems to be another loophole. Our proposed system serves as a
“time-locked safe” for data, rendering the user incapable of exposing their data – even if they want
to – for a limited time (or, in extended applications, until a specified set of requirements is met).
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This system is designed in such a way as to both ameliorate the privacy threat and to demonstrate
the anachronistic nature of the legal framework. It does so by simply removing from the user’s
power the ability to expose their data. By making it impossible to comply, we hope that legislators
will recognize the law as impossible to apply, and thereby spur them to more rational and realistic
legislation on the issue.
1.2 Background
Every year, tens of thousands(1) of phones, laptops, and other portable electronic devices are
seized, unlocked, and searched by the U.S. Customs and Border patrol. Many of these searches
would otherwise be illegal under 4th Amendment protections; however, the U.S. Government has
decided that these rights should be suspended for national security reasons. We, as well as the
American Civil Liberties Union, disagree with this decision, and where the ACLU seeks to chal-
lenge the practice in court, we wish to provide a solution that makes this practice impossible.
Moving data securely through a border is not a new problem. However, the solutions that
currently exist do not provide the kinds of legal, safe-to-use security that we provide. Hiding the
existence of data is dangerous, extremely di cult, and could potentially cause harm to users of our
software, which should not happen with our current design.
1.3 Objectives
• Store data securely.
• Follow standard data protection measures.
• Provide an simple user experience.
• Make the system clearly unbreakable within the given time period.
2
Chapter 2
Requirements
2.1 Functional Requirements
The system will:
• Allow users to erase and later recover data
• Not allow user access to erased data before the predetermined requirements are met
• Not store any values that could be identified as encrypted data and matching key
• Provide users with options to retrieve their data
• Protect user data by following standard security practices
2.2 Nonfunctional Requirements
The system will be:
• Intuitive to use for nontechnical users
• Modular
• Portable
3
Chapter 3
Use Cases
System User
Known Third Party
Post Data
to Server
Recieve Data
Figure 3.1: Use Case Diagram
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Table 3.1: Use Cases
Actor Use Case Description
System
Owner/User
Store Data Goal: To secure their data beyond even their own
grasp
Preconditions: User possesses data and system
client software on the same device; User has con-
figured client to connect the system server which
they will utilize; There is a viable connection
from the client device to the server device.
Postconditions: The user’s client device no
longer possesses the data; The client device now
possesses a one-time-pad corresponding to one
(or more) held by the server; Server has recorded
User’s preferences for the return of the data.
Exceptions: If there is an interruption of the con-
nection between client and server, the entire pro-
cess is restarted; If the user indicate that they de-
sire an atypical use where they are not the recip-
ient of the one-time-pad, they shall not receive
one.
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Chapter 4
Activity Diagrams
4.1 DeadDropBox
The following diagrams show what prototypical interactions with the system look like:
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Open System Client UI
Conﬁgure Remote Server Info
Select Local Files For Upload
Select Delivery Options
Approve Conﬁguration Summary
Wait For the System to Implement
Approved Conﬁguration
Conﬁrm Local File Deletion
Await Return of Files
Figure 4.1: User Activity Diagram
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Chapter 5
Technologies Used
5.1 Python
We chose to use Python because of its ability to run on a large number of platforms and its huge
set of packages that we could access. Although we did not end up using a significant number
of libraries, we were able to choose the libraries that we did use. In addition, Python is usually
significantly more readable than equivalent C code, and we wanted to be able to keep the system
as simple as possible.
5.1.1 PyCryptodome
PyCryptodome is a fork of the PyCrypto package that is currently deprecated. It provides a wealth
of encryption functions. For this project, we use Crypto.RSA for key exchange, Crypto.AES for
encryption, and Crypto.Random for key generation.
5.1.2 Sockets
We chose to use non-stream Python sockets because of the control that we have over them and our
experience using almost identical sockets in C. In hindsight, our specific implementation - which
doesn’t not use stream sockets - is unnecessarily complex, but we were not aware of this ability
during the majority of our implementation passes.
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5.2 One-Time-Pad Encryption
Although we do use standard encryption techniques, the use of one-time-pad encryption was avail-
able because the use of the OTP is not to hide encrypted tra c, but rather to create two equal-length
files, neither of which contain any information about the original without the other. Any other se-
curity is provided by AES encryption.
9
Chapter 6
Architectural Design
6.1 Dead Drop Box
Figure 6.1: DeadDropBox Architecture Diagram
This system uses a client-server architecture, which we intend to serve as a template for future
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iterations of this concept. Some processing is done on the client side, in order to hide the contents
of the data stored from the server.
In the current implementation of the system, the client and server can be any platform capable
of running Python 3. As we want the system to be usable without any specialized knowledge, and
by anyone who would have data to store, we specifically made the system to be available to anyone
that would need it.
11
Chapter 7
Design Rationale
7.1 Language Choice
The system is being written in Python for the sake of rapid development and cross-platform com-
patibility. While Python, as an interpreted language, is neither extremely fast nor secure, this
project’s status as a proof of concept and the intention of the designers to implement a maximum
of variety in functionality made hardware-tailored low-level languages undesirable. Python pro-
vides vast libraries which implement many of the core cryptographic and networking tools which
the system uses, and does so with little hassle. We also intend for our code to be very modular and
expandable, and Python allows for that, not only within its own features but also through the many
development frameworks which are built on it.
7.2 Hardware
As for hardware, we specifically built the system to be cross-platform, including declining the use
of a library (pysendfile) because it would not have worked on Windows machines. The system
should function on any system with Python 3 installed, which, to our knowledge, includes any
modern machine.
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Chapter 8
Risk Analysis
Risk Likelihood Severity Impact Prevention
Raspberry Pi Failure 0.2 4 0.8 Don’t rely on having
full set of Pis at all
times
Power Supply Unit
Failure
0.05 8 0.4 Have access to a
backup power supply
Language Familiarity
Issues
0.3 2 0.6 Familiarize with
language before imple-
mentation begins
Data Loss 0.01 10 0.01 Use version control
software such as Git
Obsolescence 0.001 5 0.005 Generalize the solution
such as to be config-
urable to the legal situ-
ations of multiple coun-
tries
13
Chapter 9
Development Timeline
WBS NUMBER TASK TASK OWNER
FALL QUARTER WINTER QUARTER SPRING QUARTER
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 Project Definition
1.1 Project Conception All
1.2 Problem Statement All
1.3 Key Generation Research Peter
1.4 DeadDropBox Research Nat, Robert
1.5 Design Experimentation All
1.7 Design Report All
2 Design Formalization
2.1 Prepare for Design Review All
2.3 Revise Design Report All
3 Implementation
3.1 System Prototyping All
3.1.1 Basic Server-Side File Storage Nat, Robert
3.1.2 Basic Key Generation Server Peter
3.2 Secure Communication Peter
3.3 Clientside data encryption Nat
3.4 Serverside Key Storage Robert
3.5 Operational Implementation All
3.6 Data Retrieval Mechanisms Robert, Peter
3.7 Key Authentication and Revocation Peter
4 Testing
4.1 Key Randomness Testing Peter
4.2 Communication Testing Nat
4.3 No-Access Verification Robert
4.4 Network Testing Robert
5 Presentation
5.1 User Interface Creation Nat
5.2 Design Conference Presentation All
5.4 Final Design Report All
5.5 Final Implementation All
Figure 9.1: Gantt Chart of Development Timeline
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Chapter 10
Societal Issues
10.1 Ethical
Our system is designed to prevent an abuse of the current legal system - illegal search and seizure.
We believe strongly that such abuses by the government are themselves extremely unethical, and
as such, our attempt to prevent them from what we and others consider to be serious breaches of
the Fourth Amendment - or at least open a discussion about how we should protect our borders in
terms of electronic devices, instead of accepting a unilateral decision by a government who may
not have the best interests of its citizens in mind.
10.2 Social
This system is designed solve to what we see as a social issue, so it has taken that social situation -
legally grey areas of search and seizure created because of 21st century technology - and created a
way that hopefully could force a serious discussion about it. By bringing this issue more towards
the forefront and allowing people learn about it, we can prevent abuse of our civil liberties.
10.3 Political
Although this project does, in some ways, contradict the public (through disallowing government-
created directives from being executed), we believe that these policies do not represent the views
of an educated public.
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10.4 Usability
We specifically designed our system such that anyone who had a reason to use our device (which
requires a mobile device such as a laptop) would also, as a rule, have access to our software. Since
the first device has to exist for the software to be needed, and the second can be almost anything,
we feel that there should be no barriers to prevent people from using our system.
10.5 Lifelong learning
This project definitely taught us about the upsides of exploring new technologies. As part of this
project, we both acquired new skills and noted that there are plenty of things that we have yet to
learn, but are very important.
10.6 Compassion
Our system is designed to prevent people from being taken advantage of because they do know
know information that they shouldn’t be expected to know.
10.7 Manufacturability, Economic, Environmental Impact, Health
and Safety, Sustainability, and Environmental Impact
As our product is not a physical product, and does not consume any physical resources to build,
maintain, or modify, these issues do not apply.
16
Chapter 11
Conclusions
11.1 Summary
For this project, we created a simple, usable, and secure way for users to store data when crossing
the American border. While our solution is not a viable end product that could be used on a wide
scale, it does show that such system could absolutely be made. We hope that someone with access
to greater resources takes our idea and spreads it, so that the issues that we discussed earlier can
be brought to the attention of the public before the opportunity to debate them is lost.
11.2 What We Learned
One of the biggest things that we learned was that the initial design of a project needs to be flex-
ible. Our initial design included a number of elements that ended up being significantly more
complex for us to implement than we expected because of platform restrictions of the libraries we
were planning on using. For example, we initially intended to use the pysendfile package before
discovering that it did not support windows. Additionally, Peter did a significant amount of work
to create a working RSA key generation algorithm before realizing that actually using that key in
the standard Python encryption algorithms was not going to work without breaking the security of
those packages.
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11.3 Advantages and Disadvantages
Overall, we’re quite happy with the core of our solution. It has all of the core features that we were
aiming for, and was written such that extending the project should be relatively simple. In terms of
problems that still remain, there are a few that we knew that we were not going to implement, such
as hard deletion of the source file, a way to reconstruct an emailed data, persistence and recovery
if the TCP connection is broken, multithreading, and self-implemented key generation.
11.4 Future Work
There is a significant amount of future work that could be done on this project. Implementing any
of the missing features listed above would greatly increase the usefulness of the project. It would
be very useful for anyone wanting to continue our work of they could get the project to a state
where they could host a webserver that had the ability to act as a server while providing a user-
friendly interface, as I think that the largest challenge with a project like this is getting people to
use it, and while we have made it as simple as entering a few inputs, the less intimidating a system
like this is, the better.
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Appendix A
Code Listings
A.1 Client (client.py)
# Client recieves arguements
# Client opens connection with server
# Client encrypts file
# Client sends file, arguments
# Client waits for server response
# if server reports all clear, destroy original file
# else, throw execption, release file
#the core server code
import socket
import sys
import os
import datetime
#from threading import *
from lib import *
import hashlib
import keygen
from Crypto.PublicKey import RSA
from Crypto.Cipher import AES, PKCS1_OAEP
from Crypto.Random import get_random_bytes
from email.utils import parseaddr
###DEFINES
fname = ’’
MAXWAITS = 10
BUFSIZE = 4096
#HOST = "127.0.0.1"
#PORT = 4321 #I’m gonna keep this as the default port
DEFAULT_HOST = ’172.22.173.33’
DEFAULT_PORT = 4321
###END DEFINES
def con(HOST = socket.gethostbyname(socket.gethostname()),PORT = 4321):
#get socket
s = socket.socket()
#if any socket settings changes are needed, they go here
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#connect to host
HOST = input("Host? (default is localhost)") #may have to fix these due to the janky way that I did logging
PORT = input("Port? (default is 4321)")
try:
s.connect((HOST, int(PORT))) #https://docs.python.org/2/library/socket.html
except:
s.connect((DEFAULT_HOST, DEFAULT_PORT))
print("Failed to connect to host, using defaults instead\n", flush = True)
return s
def get_commands():
#print("Commands not yet implemented")
#sys.stdout.flush()
inp = input("Email Address for return: ")
com = "|EMAIL|"
if not inp:
print("No return address provided, quitting.\n")
return
email = parseaddr(inp)[1]
if (not ’@’ in email or not ’.’ in email):
print("Unacceptable email, quitting.\n")
return
com += email + ’|’
sleeptime = input("Time to sleep, in seconds: ")
if not sleeptime:
sleeptime = ’10’
com += sleeptime + ’|’
return com
def get_datablob():
global fname
fname = input("File: ")
inf = open(fname,"rb")
buf = inf.read(1)
t = bytearray()
while(buf):
t += buf
buf = inf.read(100)
return t
def send_init(s,data):
initpkt = InitPacket(commands,len(data))
print("Sending InitPacket:\n\tCommands: "+ str(initpkt.commands) + "\n\tBlobsize: " + str(initpkt.blobsize) + "\n" )
print("Data: " + str(data))
#Send Data
s.sendall(str(initpkt.commands).encode(’latin-1’))
print("Sent commands.\n")
s.recv(BUFSIZE)
s.sendall(str(initpkt.blobsize).encode(’latin-1’))
print("Sent size.\n")
s.recv(BUFSIZE)
print("Sent InitPacket")
return initpkt.blobsize
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def send_blob(s,data):
dblob = DataBlob(data)
print("Sending DataBlob:\n\tSize: "+str(dblob.size)+"\n\tHash: "+ str(dblob.md5hash) +"\n\tData: " + str(dblob.data))
for i in range(dblob.size//BUFSIZE + 1):
print("Sent: part " + str(i))
s.sendall(dblob.data[i*BUFSIZE:(i+1)*BUFSIZE].encode(’latin-1’))
s.recv(BUFSIZE)
print("Sent DataBlob")
def recv_reply(s,data):
rep = s.recv(BUFSIZE).decode(’latin-1’)
print("Recieved ReplyPacket Hash: " + str(rep) + "\n")
##os.flush()
return (rep == hashlib.md5(data).hexdigest())
def send_AES(sock):
public_key = sock.recv(BUFSIZE).decode(’latin-1’)
AES_key = get_random_bytes(16)
encryped_AES_key = PKCS1_OAEP.new(RSA.import_key(public_key)).encrypt(AES_key)
AES_key_object = AES.new(AES_key, AES.MODE_EAX)
sock.sendall(encryped_AES_key)
sock.recv(BUFSIZE)
sock.sendall(str(AES_key_object.nonce).encode(’latin-1’))
return AES_key_object, AES_key
def recv_data(sock, numpacks):
datastr = ""
print("expecting " + str(numpacks) + " packets")
for i in range(numpacks):
print("Recieving part " + str(i))
datastr = datastr + sock.recv(BUFSIZE).decode(’latin-1’)
sock.sendall("ACK".encode(’latin-1’))
return datastr
def check_args():
print("check_args() isn’t finished!\n")
def FAIL():
print("Program was passed bad arguments\nCorrect arguments: <host> <port>\nQUITTING\n",flush=True)
exit()
#if (sys.argv[1]) #I’ll just leave the hostname/ip formatting check to the exception catch in con() for now
if (sys.argv[2].isnumeric() and 0 < int(sys.argv[1]) < 65535):
pass
else:
FAIL()
if __name__ == "__main__":
print ("Client started:", datetime.datetime.today().isoformat(),"\n")
sys.stdout.flush()
if len(sys.argv[1:]): #DEAL WITH COMMAND LINE USAGE HERE
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CL = True
check_args() #write this
s = con(sys.args[1],sys.args[2])
else:
CL = False
s = con(DEFAULT_HOST, DEFAULT_PORT)
#connect
AES_init_bytes = get_random_bytes(16)
private_AES_key_object = AES.new(AES_init_bytes, AES.MODE_EAX)
AES_key_object, conn_AES = send_AES(s)
print("AES key: " + str(conn_AES))
print("AES nonce: " + str(AES_key_object.nonce))
sys.stdout.flush()
#Prompt user for commands
commands = get_commands()
#Create data object
data = AES_encrypt(private_AES_key_object, get_datablob())
size = send_init(s,data)
send_blob(s,data.decode(’latin-1’))
#Wait for reply
valid = recv_reply(s,data)
print("Hash Comparison Check: " + str(valid) + "\n")
sys.stdout.flush()
#Recieve OTP
otp = recv_data(s, size//BUFSIZE + 1)
file = open("otp", ’w’)
file.write(otp)
file.close()
#Wait
#Recieve OTP ˆ Data
xor = recv_data(s, size//BUFSIZE + 1)
print("Recieved encoded: \n" + str(xor))
sys.stdout.flush()
otp_file = open("otp", ’r’)
otp = otp_file.read()
data = ""
for a, b in zip(xor, otp):
data += str(int(a) ˆ int(b))
print("Read otp: \n" + otp)
print("Got data: \n" + data)
sys.stdout.flush()
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enc_data = ""
for i in range(len(data)//8):
enc_data += chr(int(data[i*8:i*8 + 8], 2))
print("Encrypted data: " + enc_data)
sys.stdout.flush()
data = AES_decrypt(AES.new(AES_init_bytes, AES.MODE_EAX, private_AES_key_object.nonce), enc_data)
print("File name: " + fname)
sys.stdout.flush()
file = open(fname.split(’.’)[0] + "_out." + fname.split(’.’)[1], ’wb’)
file.write(data);
file.close()
s.close()
print("Connection Closed")
sys.stdout.flush()
A.2 Server (server.py)
#the core server code
import socket
import sys
import os
import datetime
from threading import *
import lib
import hashlib
import keygen
import math
from Crypto.PublicKey import RSA
from Crypto.Cipher import AES, PKCS1_OAEP
from Crypto.Random import get_random_bytes
###DEFINES
NUMTHREADS = 1 #actual running, 10 maybe? 1 for now since we just need to test that it works at all
MAXWAITS = 10
HOST = socket.gethostbyname(socket.gethostname())
PORT = 4321
BUFSIZE = 4096
OTP_KEY_EXTENSION = ".OTPkey"
GLOBAL_THREADNO = 0
###END DEFINES
def generateOTP(name,length): #returns name of file holding generated One Time Pad
length = math.ceil(length/8) * 8
otpname = name + OTP_KEY_EXTENSION
otpfile = open(otpname, "wb")
print("Length: " + str(length))
otp = str(bin(keygen.__getLargeRandom(length)))
print("Generated: " + otp)
otpfile.write(otp[2:].encode(’latin-1’))
25
otpfile.close()
return otpname
def applyOTP(name,otpname): #returns false if infile is empty, name of file holding result otherwise
resname = name + "_x_" + otpname
f1 = open(name,"rb")
f2 = open(otpname,"rb")
out = open(resname,"wb")
byte1 = f1.read(1)
byte2 = f2.read(1)
if (not byte1 or not byte2):
return False
while(byte1 and byte2):
bout = bytes([ord(byte1) ˆ ord(byte2)])
out.write(bout)
byte1 = f1.read(1)
byte2 = f2.read(1)
if (not byte1 and byte2):
print("WARN: infile shorter than key!")
if (byte1 and not byte2):
print("WARN: key shorter than infile!")
#log_file.flush()
f1.close()
f2.close()
out.close()
return resname
def recieve_commands(conn):
init_commands = conn.recv(BUFSIZE).decode(’latin-1’)
print("Recieved commands: " + str(init_commands) + "\n")
conn.sendall("ACK".encode(’latin-1’))
return init_commands
def recieve_size(conn):
init_size = conn.recv(BUFSIZE).decode(’latin-1’)
conn.sendall("ACK".encode(’latin-1’))
print("Recieved size: " + str(init_size) + "\n")
return init_size
def recieve_data(conn, numpacks):
datastr = ""
for i in range(numpacks):
print("Recieving part " + str(i))
datastr = datastr + conn.recv(BUFSIZE).decode(’latin-1’)
conn.sendall("ACK".encode(’latin-1’))
return datastr
def send_data(conn, data):
print("Sending Data...")
for i in range(len(data)//BUFSIZE + 1):
print("Sent: part " + str(i))
conn.sendall(data[i*BUFSIZE:(i+1)*BUFSIZE].encode(’latin-1’))
conn.recv(BUFSIZE)
print("Sent all: " + data)
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def get_AES_key(conn):
if not (os.path.isfile("public_key.pem")):
RSA_key = RSA.generate(1024)
private_key = RSA_key.export_key()
private_file = open("private_key.pem", "wb")
private_file.write(private_key)
public_key = RSA_key.publickey().export_key()
public_file = open("public_key.pem", "wb")
public_file.write(public_key)
public_key = open("public_key.pem").read()
conn.sendall(public_key.encode(’latin-1’))
encrypted_AES_key = conn.recv(BUFSIZE)
conn.sendall("0".encode(’latin-1’))
nonce = conn.recv(BUFSIZE)
private_key = RSA.import_key(open("private_key.pem").read())
k_AES = PKCS1_OAEP.new(private_key).decrypt(encrypted_AES_key)
return AES.new(k_AES, AES.MODE_EAX, nonce), k_AES
def connHandler():
global GLOBAL_THREADNO
threadno = str(GLOBAL_THREADNO + 1)
GLOBAL_THREADNO += 1
def fail():
print ("Sending Fail Packet\n")
#conn.send(lib.ReplyPacket())
print(HOST)
s = socket.socket()
s.bind((HOST, PORT))
s.listen(MAXWAITS)
thisthread = str(current_thread())
print("Thread #" , thisthread ,": Handler started\n")
sys.stdout.flush()
conn, addr = s.accept()
print("Thread #", thisthread ,":",addr, "connected\n")
sys.stdout.flush()
#Key Exchange
AES_key_object, k_AES = get_AES_key(conn)
print("AES key: " + str(k_AES))
print("AES nonce: " + str(AES_key_object.nonce))
sys.stdout.flush()
#Send initial packet
init_commands = recieve_commands(conn)
init_size = recieve_size(conn)
init_data = lib.InitPacket(init_commands, init_size)
if not init_data:
print("Thread #", thisthread ,":","Failed, no data recieved\n")
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return
print("Thread #", thisthread ,":","Received connect from ", repr(addr), "\n")
print("Thread #", thisthread ,":","\tblob size: ", init_data.blobsize)
sys.stdout.flush()
datastr = recieve_data(conn, int(init_data.blobsize)//BUFSIZE + 1)
#Recieve file
blob_data = lib.DataBlob(datastr)
print("Created datablob\n")
if not blob_data:
print ("Thread #", thisthread ,":","Failed, blob data not recieved\n")
fail()
return
#pull the data from the blob
if (blob_data.md5hash != hashlib.md5(blob_data.data.encode(’latin-1’)).hexdigest()):
print("Thread #", thisthread ,":","Failed, hashes do not match:", blob_data.md5hash, "vs." , hashlib.md5(blob_data.md5hash.encode(’latin-1’)).hexdigest(), "\n")
print("Data: " + str(blob_data.data))
fail()
return
sys.stdout.flush()
#send reply
conn.send(blob_data.md5hash.encode(’latin-1’))
print ("Thread #", thisthread ,":","Sent success packet\n")
sys.stdout.flush()
#Convert data to binary
blob_data = lib.DataBlob(’’.join(format(ord(i),’b’).zfill(8) for i in blob_data.data))
print("Data: " + blob_data.data)
#Generate OTP of correct length
generateOTP(threadno, blob_data.size)
otpfile = open(threadno + OTP_KEY_EXTENSION, "r")
otp = otpfile.read()
print("OTP: " + otp)
otpfile.seek(0)
outfile = open(str(threadno) + ".blobfile","w+b")
data_bin = blob_data.data
#if int(data_bin, 2) % 8 != 0:
#print("Adding " + str(8 - (int(data_bin, 2) % 8)) + " 0s")
#data_bin = "0" * (8 - (int(data_bin, 2) % 8)) + data_bin
otp_bin = otp
#data_bin = ’’.join(format(ord(i),’b’) for i in blob_data.data)
#otp_bin = ’’.join(format(ord(i),’b’) for i in otp)
print("Data_binary: " + data_bin)
print("OTP_binary: " + otp)
sys.stdout.flush()
encstr = ""
for a, b in zip(data_bin, otp_bin):
encstr += str(int(a) ˆ int(b))
print("outp1: " + encstr)
outfile.write(encstr.encode(’latin-1’))
outfile.close()
print ("Thread #", thisthread ,":","Wrote recieved data to file\n")
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sys.stdout.flush()
#Send OTP
send_data(conn, otp_bin)
print("Sending ...")
sys.stdout.flush()
#Wait for some time
print("Waiting for " + init_data.commands.split(’|’)[3] + " seconds.\n")
sys.stdout.flush()
lib.wait_dhms(0,0,0,int(init_data.commands.split(’|’)[3]))
#Reread file
infile = open(str(threadno) + ".blobfile","r")
enc = infile.read()
print("Sending encoded...")
sys.stdout.flush()
lib.send_file_email_quick(init_data.commands.split(’|’)[2], str(threadno) + ".blobfile")
send_data(conn, enc)
conn.close()
s.close()
print ("Thread #", thisthread ,":","closed\n")
sys.stdout.flush()
#log_file.flush()
#def listenerThreads():
#th = []
#for i in range(NUMTHREADS): #for the constant version of this use threading.activeCount() in a loop
#thr = Thread(target=connHandler, args = ())
#thr.start()
#th.append(thr)
#log_file.flush()
#for thread in th:
# while thread.isAlive():
# pass
if __name__ == "__main__":
#log_file = open("log_" + datetime.datetime.today().isoformat().replace(":","-") + ".txt","w") #I think this will make an ISO timestamped logfile
#sys.stdout = log_file #all "print"s go to a logfile
print ("Server started:", datetime.datetime.today().isoformat(),"\n")
sys.stdout.flush()
#os.flush()
#listenerThreads()
connHandler()
print("Connection Closed\n")
sys.stdout.flush()
#os.flush()
sys.stdout = sys.__stdout__
#log_file.close()
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A.3 Library Functions (lib.py)
import sys
import hashlib
import smtplib
import time
from email.mime.text import MIMEText
from email.mime.multipart import MIMEMultipart
from email.mime.base import MIMEBase
from email import encoders
from Crypto.Cipher import AES
class InitPacket:
#this should store the details about the file to be sent & what to do with it
def __init__(self,commands=’’,blobsize=0):
self.commands = commands
self.blobsize = blobsize
class DataBlob:
def __init__(self,data = None):
if data is None:
self.data = []
self.size = 0
self.md5hash = 0
else:
self.data = data
self.size = len(data)
self.md5hash = hashlib.md5(data.encode(’latin-1’)).hexdigest()
def update(self,new):
self.data += new
self.size = len(data)
self.md5hash = hashlib.md5(data.encode(’latin-1’)).hexdigest()
class ReplyPacket:
def __init__(self, success = False, ret_hash = hashlib.md5("error".encode(’latin-1’)).hexdigest()):
self.success = success
self.ret_hash = ret_hash
def AES_encrypt(key, data):
a = key.encrypt(data)
print(type(a))
return a
def AES_decrypt(key, data):
return key.decrypt(data.encode(’latin-1’))
def send_file_email(email_server,email_port,email_user,email_pass,email_to,email_subj,email_msg,email_filename):
mail = MIMEMultipart()
mail[’From’] = email_user
mail[’To’] = email_to
mail[’Subject’] = email_subj
mail.attach(MIMEText(email_msg,’plain’))
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atmt = open(email_filename,’rb’)
part = MIMEBase("application",’octet-stream’)
part.set_payload(atmt.read())
encoders.encode_base64(part)
part.add_header(’Content-Disposition’,’attachment; filename=’+email_filename)
mail.attach(part)
email_contents = mail.as_string()
srv = smtplib.SMTP(email_server,email_port)
srv.starttls()
srv.login(email_user,email_pass)
srv.sendmail(email_user,email_to,email_contents)
srv.quit()
def send_file_email_quick(address,filename):
send_file_email(’smtp.gmail.com’,587,’tt463’+’1309’+’@gm’+’ail.com’,’ddb_’+’sr’+’c_pass’,address,’Your data’,’Your OTP:’,filename)
def mail_test():
send_file_email(’smtp.gmail.com’,587,’tt4’+’631309@gm’+’ail.com’,’dd’+’b_src_p’+’ass’,’tt46’+’31309@’+’gm’+’ail.’+’com’,’test’,’test test test test’,’requirements.txt’)
def wait_dhms(days,hours,minutes,seconds):
hours = hours + days*24
minutes = minutes + hours*60
seconds = seconds + minutes*60
time.sleep(seconds)
A.4 Key Generation (keygen.py)
from os import urandom
import random
DEBUG = False
def __getRandomBitstream(bits):
return urandom(bits//8)
def __isPrime(n, trials):
"""
Miller-Rabin primality test.
A return value of False means n is certainly not prime. A return value of
True means n is very likely a prime.
Source: RosettaCode.com
"""
if n!=int(n):
return False
n=int(n)
s = 0
d = n-1
while d%2==0:
d>>=1
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s+=1
assert(2**s * d == n-1)
def trial_composite(a):
if pow(a, d, n) == 1:
return False
for i in range(s):
if pow(a, 2**i * d, n) == n-1:
return False
return True
for i in range(trials):
a = random.randrange(2, n)
if trial_composite(a):
return False
return True
’’’
Generates a cryptographically random stream of bits.
Returns a str
’’’
def __getLargeRandom(keylen):
key = "";
keyarr = __getRandomBitstream(keylen)
for i in range(keylen//8):
key = key + str(bin(keyarr[i])[2:]).zfill(8)
return int(key, 2)
def __getLargeRandomPrime(length):
i = 0
while(True):
i += 1
num = __getLargeRandom(length)
if i % 10 == 0:
print(’.’, end="")
if(__isPrime(num, 30)):
print("Processed " + str(i) + " numbers.")
return num
’’’
Generates a cryptographically random stream of bits for use in the
AES encryption standard.
Recommended keylengths: 128, 192, 256
Returns a binary number
’’’
def getAESKey(keylen):
return __getLargeRandom(keylen)
’’’
Uses pseudocode from Wikipedia
’’’
def __euclideanGCD(num, mod):
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div = mod // num
rem = mod % num
if DEBUG:
print(str(mod) + " = " + str(div) + " * " + str(num) + " + " + str(rem))
if rem == 0:
return num, list()
else:
a, eqs = __euclideanGCD(rem, num)
eqs.append([mod, div, num])
return a, eqs
def __modInverse(num, mod):
gcd, eqlist = __euclideanGCD(num, mod)
if gcd != 1:
return -1
factorA = (1, eqlist[0][0])
factorB = (-eqlist[0][1], eqlist[0][2])
if DEBUG:
print(str(gcd), end="")
print(" = " + str(factorA[0]) + " * " + str(factorA[1]), end="")
print(" + " + str(factorB[0]) + " * " + str(factorB[1]))
for i in range(len(eqlist) - 1):
eq = eqlist[i + 1]
factorB = (factorB[0], eq[0])
factorA = (factorA[0] - eq[1] * factorB[0], factorA[1])
if DEBUG:
print(str(gcd), end="")
print(" = " + str(factorA[0]) + " * " + str(factorA[1]), end="")
print(" + " + str(factorB[0]) + " * " + str(factorB[1]))
if(factorA[1] < factorB[1]):
temp = tuple(factorA)
factorA = tuple(factorB)
factorB = tuple(temp)
inv = factorA[0] if factorA[1] != mod else factorB[0]
return inv if inv > 0 else inv + mod
’’’
Returns a secure RSA keypair and modulus.
’’’
def getRSAKeypair(keylen):
p = __getLargeRandomPrime(keylen)
q = __getLargeRandomPrime(keylen)
n = p * q
mod = (p-1)*(q-1)
pub = 65537
priv = __modInverse(pub, mod)
return pub, mod, priv
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if __name__ == "__main__":
if(DEBUG):
#print(str(__modInverse(42, 2017)))
#print(str(__modInverse(11, 14)))
#print(str(__modInverse(17, 780)))
print(getRSAKeypair(1024))
print(getAESKey(128))
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